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1. Introduction
One of the most critical issues to emerge in the WTO recently is that of compliance
with the decisions of dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body. Once a decision
has been rendered, how can a complaining party seek to ensure that the defending party
faithfully implements it? What recourse is available to the complainant if the defendant
refuses to comply?
These issues have emerged in a relatively small number of high profile and usually highly
politicized disputes. Under the rules of the WTO, where a defending party fails to imple-
ment a panel or Appellate Body decision, a complaining party ultimately has the right to
respond with retaliatory trade sanctions. Yet the imposition of sanctions often hurts the
commercial interests of the complaining party as much as the defendant, and the ability of
such retaliation to induce compliance is far from certain.
This article examines key issues of compliance and retaliation under the WTO Agree-
ment. It is divided into three parts. First, it examines the theory of retaliation. This includes
a discussion of the remedies provided for in the WTO Agreement, and the purpose of
retaliation under the GATT and the WTO.
Second, it examines the practice of retaliation. It reviews the cases to date in which the
retaliation provisions of the DSU have been invoked. It considers issues such as who de-
termines non-compliance, the means by which a complaining party can obtain the right to
retaliate, the quantification of the level of authorized sanctions, and the termination of
retaliation. It also examines problems associated with the application of sanctions. Third,
it considers alternative and additional means of seeking compliance, including compensa-
tion, fines, rotating or "carousel" retaliation, collective retaliation, and punitive sanctions.
*Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Canada to the World Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. An
earlier version of this paper was presented at the May 3-4, 2001 conference of the Canadian Bar Association
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HI. The Theory of Retaliation
A. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: HIERARCHY OF REMEDIES
The WTO dispute settlement system contains three key features that are absent from
the dispute settlement provisions of most international treaties: (1) panels that have com-
pulsory jurisdiction to examine complaints about violations of the Agreement; (2) appellate
review of panel decisions, again with compulsory jurisdiction; and (3) the ability to render
binding decisions.'
Decisions of panels and the Appellate Body are adopted virtually automatically by the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), pursuant to the so-called "negative consensus"
rule.2 Where a country has been found to have breached its commitments, the panel and
Appellate Body reports normally recommend that the offending country bring itself into
conformity with its WTO obligations. Upon adoption of the reports, the recommendations
of the panel and Appellate Body become DSB rulings. In order to comply with a DSB
ruling, the defendant may have to repeal or amend its laws to eliminate the WTO-
inconsistency.
How does the complaining party enforce such WTO rulings?
It should be noted at the outset that DSB rulings are not self-executing. It remains up
to each defending party-a sovereign government-to choose how, and even if, it will
implement the ruling.
Article 21.3 of the DSU provides that if it is "impracticable" for the defending country
to comply immediately with the DSB rulings, it is given a "reasonable period of time" for
implementation.' The issue of retaliation may arise if the defending party has not imple-
mented the DSB rulings at the end of this compliance period.
Article 3.7 of the DSU sets out the hierarchy of remedies in 'WTO dispute settlement.
It seeks to encourage, in descending order of preference: (1) bilateral settlement; (2) with-
drawal by the defendant of the WTO-inconsistent measure; (3) compensation and (4) as a
"last resort" retaliation. 4
1. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement] Annex 2, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 12 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
2. The "negative consensus" or "automaticity" rule provides that certain specified requests to the DSB must
be granted unless all WTO Members at the DSB meeting-including the Member that made the request-
choose to reject it. The negative consensus rule applies to panel establishment, to the adoption of panel and
Appellate Body reports, and to requests to retaliate. DSU, supra note 1, art. 6.1, 16.4, 17.14, 22.6 and 22.7.
3. If the disputing parties cannot agree on the "reasonable period of time" for implementation, DSUArticle
21.3(c) provides that it can be determined through arbitration. DSU, supra note 1, art. 21(3)(c).
4. DSU, supra note 1, art. 3.7. Article 3.7 provides in part as follows:
The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution
mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly
to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement
mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be
inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements. The provision of compensation
should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a tem-
porary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent with a covered agreement.
The last resort which this Understanding provides to the Member invoking the dispute settlement
procedures is the possibility of suspending the application of concessions or other obligations under
the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-A-vis the other Member, subject to authorization
by the DSB of such measures.
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A complaining party retaliates when it "suspends concessions or other obligations under
the covered agreements."5 In other words, the complainant denies benefits that it would
otherwise be legally required to extend to the other WTO Member.
Most retaliation requests seek to suspend concessions. One example of a concession is a
tariff binding, which is a commitment not to impose duties on a product above a certain
specified rate. By "suspending" such a concession, the complaining party could impose
duties above the bound rate on products from the defending party. It would do so with the
authorization of the DSB. It would also suspend concessions on a non-most-favoured-
nation basis-the retaliatory rates would be imposed solely on the imports of the defending
party.
More recently, the EC and Japan sought to suspend "other obligations" by requesting
DSB authorization to adopt laws to "mirror" the WTO-inconsistent U.S. Anti-Dumping
Act of 1916. This is discussed below in the "Cases to Date" section (infra Part III.A).
B. RETALIATION UNDER THE GATT
The WTO retaliation system is based in part on the rules of the WTO's predecessor
organization, the GATT. An important reason why the drafters of the original GATT 1947
included a provision on retaliation was to curb the customary international law right of
unilateral reprisal, and to replace it with multilaterally-authorized retaliation.6 As stated by
one of the drafters:
We have asked the nations of the world to confer upon an international organization the right
to limit their power to retaliate. We have sought to tame retaliation, to discipline it, to keep
it within bounds. By subjecting it to the restraints of international control, we have endeavoured
to check its spread and growth, to convert it from a weapon of economic warfare to an instru-
ment of international order.7
This notion of "taming retaliation" was carried into the WTO. DSU Article 23 prohibits
unilateral, unauthorized action by the complaining party.'
Article XXIII:2 of GATI 1947 provides, in part, that if the members of the GATT,
acting collectively, considered that the circumstances were "serious enough," they could
"authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting
party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they may
determine to be appropriate in the circumstances."9
However, this provision was subject to the normal "positive consensus" rule of the GATT,
which meant that any request by a complaining party to retaliate required the consent of
all GAIT Contracting Parties, including the defendant itself. This effectively ensured that
the retaliation provisions of the GATT remained a dead letter. Indeed, in the entire history
of the GATT (1948-1994), the GATT General Council approved a request for retaliation
only once, and this was never implemented. °
5. Id.
6. ERNST-ULRICH PETRsMANN, THE GATT/WTO DIsa SETrLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DIsPuTE SETrLEMRNT 82 (KIuwer Law International 1997).
7. Id.
8. DSU, supra note 1, art. 23.
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A-i 1, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
10. See Netherlands-Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, Nov. 8, 1952, GATT B.I.S.D.
(1st Supp.) at 32 (1953).
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C. PURPOSE OF RETALIATION
Under the GATT, one of the primary purposes of retaliation was to allow for a restoration
of the "balance of concessions" between the complaining and defending parties under the
Agreement. Each party to the GAIT received commercial benefits from the legally binding
market access comnmitments (concessions) made by the other parties. It was argued that
since a violation of the GATT by a country upset this equilibrium of commercial benefits,
retaliation would permit the restoration of the balance. As one informed observer wrote:
"retaliation is fair because it re-establishes the balance of concessions between the two
parties, a balance that is thrown into disequilibrium when one party has violated GATT's
rules."1"
Under the WTO, however, it is clear that the main objective of the complaining party
is not a restoration of the balance of concessions, but is rather to induce the defending
party to comply with its obligations. As noted by the arbitral panel in Bananas: "the au-
thorization to suspend concessions or other obligations is a temporary measure pending
full implementation by the Member concerned. We agree with the United States that this
temporary nature indicates that it is the purpose of countermeasures to induce compliance."2
(Emphasis in original)
A similar statement was made by the arbitral panel in BrazilAircraft, in seeking to define
the term "appropriate countermeasures" in Article 4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures:
While the parties have referred to dictionary definitions for the term "countermeasures", we
find it more appropriate to refer to its meaning in general international law and to the work
of the International Law Commission (ILC) on state responsibility, which addresses the notion
of countermeasures. We note that the ILC work is based on relevant state practice as well as
on judicial decisions and doctrinal writings, which constitute recognized sources of interna-
tional law. When considering the definition of "countermeasures". . . we note that counter-
measures are meant to "induce (the State which has committed an internationally wrongful
act) to comply with its obligations.. . ." We note in this respect that the Article 22.6 arbitrators
in the EC-Bananas (1999) arbitration made a similar statement. We conclude that a counter-
measure is "appropriate" inter alia if it effectively induces compliance [original emphasis]. 3
11. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FoRDuAw INrr'L L.J. 51 (1987), reprinted in JOHN H.
JACKSON ET AL., LEG . PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TErr ON
THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATioNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 371 (3d ed., West
Publishing Co. 1995).
12. European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to
Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU: Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/
DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 1999), at http://www.wto.org. The statement cited above was quoted with approval by the
arbitrators in the Hormones case: see European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones). Original Complaint by Canada. Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under
Article 22.6 of the DSU: Decision of the Arbitrators, WT/DS48/ARB (July 12, 1999), at http://www.wto.org;
see also European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones). Original Com-
plaint by the United States. Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the
DSU: Decision of the Arbitrators, WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999), at http://www.wto.org.
13. Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft: Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6
of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement: Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28,
2000), at http://www.wto.org.
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If the purpose of WTO retaliation is to induce compliance, has it met this objective?
Have the threat and use of sanctions led defending parties to comply with WTO rulings?
These issues are considered in the next section.
M. The Practice of Retaliation
A. CASES TO DATE1
4
Since the WTO Agreement entered into force inJanuary 1995, there have been a number
of instances in which complaining parties have sought, and in some cases received, author-
ization to retaliate.
1. EC-Bananas
There were two retaliation requests that arose from the WTO-inconsistent import re-
gime for bananas, one from the United States and the other from Ecuador. In April 1999,
the DSB authorized the United States to suspend concessions to the EC and its Member
States in the amount of U.S.$191.4 million per year for the failure of the EC to comply
with the DSB rulings in Bananas.' In May 2000, the DSB authorized Ecuador to suspend
concessions in the amount of U.S. $201.6 million.'6 (The Ecuador case was the first time
in which "cross retaliation" was authorized, i.e., retaliation in a different sector, or under a
different WTO agreement than that in which the violation occurred.) The United States
implemented its authorized retaliation, although Ecuador did not. In April 2001, the United
States and the European Union reached a provisional settlement in this dispute. Under the
terms of this agreement, U.S. sanctions were suspended on July 1, 2001, and will be "de-
finitively lifted" once the EU carries out the agreed changes to its banana import regime.
2. EC-Hormones
There were two retaliation requests made against the EC (one from the United States,
and the other from Canada) arising from the failure of the EC to withdraw its WTO-
inconsistent ban on hormone-treated beef. On July 26, 1999, the DSB authorized the
United States to suspend concessions against the EC and its Member States in the amount
of U.S.$116.8 million per year.'8 At the same DSB meeting, Canada received authorization
to suspend concessions in the amount of Cdn$11.3 million per year.' 9 Both Canada and the
United States implemented this retaliation by imposing 100 percent duties on certain ag-
ricultural imports from the EC. However, the EC has not lifted its ban on hormone-treated
beef, and the U.S. and Canadian sanctions remain in place.
14. This section is current as of January 2002.
15. Bananas: Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS27/ARB.
16. European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to
Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU: Decision by the Arbitrators, W17/
DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000), at http://www.wto.org.
17. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Government and European
Commission Reach Agreement to Resolve Long-Standing Banana Dispute (Apr. 11, 2001), available at http://
www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/04/index.shtnl. See Press Release, European Union, EU and Ecuador Reach
Agreement to Resolve WTO Banana Dispute (Apr. 30, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/
guesten.ksh?reslist.
18. Hormones: Decision by the Arbitrators. WT/DS26/ARB, at http://www.wto.org.
19. Hormones: Decision by the Arbitrators. WT/DS48/ARB, at http://www.wto.org.
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3. Australian Salmon
InJuly 1999, Canada made a request to the DSB to retaliate against Australia for Cdn$45
million in response to Australia's failure to lift its WTO-inconsistent ban on imports of
Canadian salmon.2° Canada and Australia put in place the first ad hoc "sequencing" arrange-
ment in the WTO, to allow for a prior ruling by an Article 21.5 compliance panel on the
WlTO-consistency of Australia's implementing measures. The Article 21.5 panel subse-
quently ruled that Australia had not complied.21 However, this dispute has since been largely
settled between the parties, and no sanctions have been imposed.
4. U.S. Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC)
In November 2000, the EC put in a retaliation request for U.S.$4.043 billion in the FSC
dispute.2 This is the largest retaliation request ever made in the history of the multilateral
trading system. The EC and the United States negotiated a "sequencing" agreement, to
allow for a prior ruling on the WTO-consistency of the U.S. FSC implementing legislation
through the compliance panel process. The August 2001 report of the Article 21.5 com-
pliance panel concluded that the United States had not implemented the DSB rulings; the
Appellate Body affirmed this in January 2002. 23 At the time of writing (January 2002), the
United States is expected to challenge the level of retaliation sought by the EC through
arbitration under DSU Article 22.6.
5. BrazilAircraft
In December 2000, the DSB authorized Canada to suspend concessions to Brazil in the
amount of Cdn$344.2 million as "appropriate countermeasures" within the meaning of
Article 4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, following Brazil's failure
to withdraw WTO-inconsistent subsidies in the regional aircraft sector.24 To date, Canada
has not yet implemented these countermeasures.
6. Canada Dairy
In February 2001, the United States25 and New Zealand26 each sought to suspend con-
cessions in the amount of U.S.$35 million per year in the Dairy dispute. In July 2001, an
Article 21.5 panel concluded that Canada had not implemented the DSB rulings.27 This
20. Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon - Recourse by Canada to Article 22.2 of the DSU,
WT/DS18/12 (uly 15, 1999), at http://www.wto.org.
21. Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon - Recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada: Report of
the Panel, WT/DS18/RW (Feb. 18, 2000), at http://www.wto.org.
22. United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" - Recourse by the European Com-
munities to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.2 of the DSU, WT/DS108/13 (Nov. 17,2000),
at http://www.wto.org.
23. United States -Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" -Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by the European Communities: Report of the Panel, WT/DS108/RW (Aug. 20, 2001), athttp://www/wto.org.
See also Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS108/AB/RW (an. 14, 2002), at http://www.wto.org.
24. Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS46/ARB, at
http://www.wto.org.
25. Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products- Recourse
by the United States to Article 22.2 of the DSU. WT/DSI03/17 (Feb. 19, 2001), at http://www.wto.org.
26. Canada.- Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products - Recourse
by New Zealand to Article 22.2 of the DSU, WT/DS113/17 (Feb. 19, 2001), at http://www.wto.org.
27. Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products - Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the United States: Report of the Panel, WT/DS103/RWand
WT/DS113/RW (uly 11,2001), at http://www.wto.org.
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finding of inconsistency was overturned on appeal in December, although the Appellate
Body also found that it did not have a sufficient factual basis to make a definitive deter-
mination on Canadian compliance.28 A second Article 21.5 panel is now re-examining the
Canadian measures. 9 The disputing parties put in place (and later extended) sequencing
agreements to ensure a prior ruling on the WTO-consistency of Canada's measures
through the compliance panel process.
7. U.S. 1916Anti-DumpingAct
In January 2002, the EC and Japan took the unprecedented step of seeking DSB au-
thorization to adopt laws to "mirror" the U.S. Anti-Dumping Act of 1916.30 The Appellate
Body had earlier found that this law-which, among other things, allows for treble damages
against dumped imports-violates U.S. obligations under GATT Article VI and the WTO
Anti-Dumping Agreement." When the United States failed to implement the DSB rulings
in this dispute by the expiration of the compliance period, the EC and Japan sought retal-
iation in the form of DSB authorization to adopt parallel legal regimes.32 The EC and
Japanese laws would replicate the substantive and procedural aspects of the 1916 Act, and
would apply solely to U.S. imports. This unusual request seemed to be based on the fact
that the U.S. legislation has not been applied, and so a monetary-based request to suspend
tariff concessions could be vulnerable to attack on the ground that the level of nullification
or impairment was either negligible or non-existent. (The Japanese retaliation request
states, "it is not practical to indicate the level of nullification or impairment in terms of
monetary value."33) The EC and Japanese requests were referred to arbitration under DSU
Article 22.6. The three disputing parties also announced that they would immediately sus-
pend the arbitration to allow additional time for the U.S. Congress to pass the necessary
implementing legislation.
8. U.S. Copyright Act
In January 2002, the EC sought authorization to retaliate against the United States in
the dispute over Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act.3 4 This law, which exempts certain
smaller bars, restaurants, and other public places from copyright liability when playing
music, was found to violate U.S. obligations under the TRIPS Agreement." This case is
28. Canada -Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products- Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the United States: Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS103/
AB/RW and WT/DS113/AB/RW (Dec. 3, 2001), at http://www.wto.org.
29. Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products - Second
Recourse by the United States to Article 21.5 of the DSU: Requests for the Establishment of a Panel. WT/
DSI 13/23 and WI'/DS103/23 (Dec. 6, 2001) at http://www.wto.org.
30. Unfair Competition Act (Anti-dumping Act of 1916), 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-76 (2001).
31. United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS 136/AB/R and WT/
DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000), at http-J/www.wto.org.
32. United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Recourse by the European Communities to Article 22.2 of
the DSU, WT/DS136/15 (an. 7, 2002), at http-//www.wto.org. See also United States- Anti-Dumping Act of
1916, Recourse by Japan to Article 22.2 of the DSU, WT/DS162/18 (Jan. 7, 2002), at http://www.wto.org.
33. United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Recourse byjapan to Article 22.2 of the DSU, WT/DS162/
18 (Jan. 7, 2002), at http://www.wto.org.
34. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 etseq (2001).
35. United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, Report of the Panel, WT/DS160/R (June 15,
2000), at http://www.wto.org.
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unusual, in that before the expiration of the compliance period, the parties sought an ad-
vance ruling on the level of nullification or impairment through an ad hoc arbitration under
DSU Article 2 5.36 This arbitration facilitated the negotiation of a temporary compensation
agreement, in the form of U.S. contributions to projects for EU musicians for a three-year
period." The EC then put in a retaliation request to preserve its rights pending Congres-
sional funding for the compensation arrangement. The EC sought DSB authorization to
suspend its obligations under TRIPS "to permit the levying of a special fee from U.S.
nationals in connection with border measures concerning copyright goods." 8 This "special
fee" would apparently be imposed on U.S. companies seeking the enforcement of copyright
in the EU. The EC request was referred to arbitration under DSU Article 22.6. The two
disputing parties also announced that they would immediately suspend the arbitration to
allow additional time for Congressional approval for the compensation package.
B. WHo DETERMINES NoN-COMPLLANCE?
One of the most difficult compliance issues that has confronted the WTO has been the
proper "sequencing" between the determination of WTO-consistency of the implementing
measures and the recourse by the complaining party to retaliation. In principle, the DSU
provides for a multilateral process to adjudicate disputes over whether a defending party
has implemented the DSB rulings. Article 21.5 provides in part as follows:
Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of
measures taken to comply with the [DSB] recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be
decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible
resort to the original panel. The panel shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date
of referral of the matter to it.19
Thus, Article 21.5 sets up a ninety-day procedure to determine compliance. However, it
is possible to read Article 22 to require that retaliation requests must be approved by the
DSB within thirty days of the expiration of the compliance period, or else the complaining
party would lose its right to have the request approved by negative consensus. This is the
U.S. position. If this interpretation is correct, then the ninety-day compliance process would
be completed long after the thirty-day deadline for retaliation °
This problem has arisen principally because of poor drafting in the DSU. WTO Mem-
bers have responded to this ambiguity in two ways.
First, as noted earlier, there has been a growing number of cases in which the disputing
parties have entered into bilateral "sequencing" agreements to provide that the Article 21.5
panel process must precede any retaliation under Article 22. These have been ad hoc, case-
specific solutions.
36. United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of
the DSU, Award of the Arbitrators, WT/DS160/ARB25/l (Nov. 9, 2001), at http://www.wto.org.
37. Press Release, European Commission, EU and U.S. Agree on Temporary Compensation in Copyright
Dispute (Dec. 19, 2001).
38. United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, Recourse by the European Communities to
Article 22.2 of the DSU, WT/DS160/19 (Jan. 7, 2002), at http://www.wto.org.
39. DSU, supra note 1, art. 21.5.
40. See Cherise M. Valles & Brendan P. McGivern, The Rigbt to Retaliate under the WTO Agreement: The
'Sequencing' Problem, 34(2) J. WORLD TRADE 63-84 (Apr. 2000).
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Second, in an effort to find a more durable solution to the sequencing problem, a number
of Members, including Canada, made a proposal to amend the DSU to provide clearly that
a determination of WTO-inconsistency must precede any request to suspend concessions.
This proposal was made at the December 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference4l and then
again in November 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference.42 However, any amendment to the
DSU requires the consensus of all Members, and such a consensus has not been achieved.
The November 2001 Ministerial Conference also mandated new negotiations on WTO
dispute settlement, and the sequencing issue will likely be part of those negotiations.
C. OBTAINING AUTHORIZATION TO RETALIATE
The complaining party triggers its right to retaliate by invoking DSU Article 22.2:
If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered
agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations and
rulings within the reasonable period of time ... such Member shall, if so requested, and no
later than the expiry of the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with any party
having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually accept-
able compensation. If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the
date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement
procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member
concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements. 4
The drafting of this provision leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, the procedure set
out in Article 22.2 is as follows:
• the complaining party makes an initial determination that the defending party has failed to
comply with the DSB rulings within the implementation period;
" the complaining party may-but is not required to-seek compensation from the defendant;
" while the text is not completely clear on this point, if the complaining party chooses not to
seek compensation, it then waits until twenty days after the expiration of the compliance
period before seeking to retaliate; and
" if the complaining party does seek compensation, but the negotiations fail to produce sat-
isfactory compensation within twenty days after the expiration of the compliance period, it
may request authorization from the DSB to retaliate. 4
Article 22.6 provides that the DSB shall, upon request, grant authorization to suspend
concessions or other obligations within thirty days of expiration of the compliance period,
unless the defending party invokes its right to arbitration. The defending party may seek
arbitration on the grounds that the retaliation sought is excessive. In a situation of "cross-
retaliation," the defendant may also argue that certain principles, as set out in Article 22.3,
have not been followed. 4" The arbitration is supposed to be completed within sixty days,
during which time no retaliation may occur.
41. Ministerial Conference Proposed Amendment to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Govern-
ing the Settlement of Disputes, WT/MIN(99)/I 5 (Dec. 3, 1999), at http'J/www.wto.org.
42. Amendment of Certain Provisions of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
dement of Disputes: Amendment Submission by Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Japan,
Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Switzerland, Uruguay and Venezuela, WT/MIN(01)/W/6 (Nov. 1, 2001),
at http://www.wto.org.
43. DSU, supra note 1, art. 22.2.
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Article 22.7 provides that the arbitrator cannot "examine the nature of the concessions
or other obligations to be suspended" but must instead "determine whether the level of
such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment." The arbitrator
may also examine whether the principles of Article 22.3 have been followed.
The decision of the arbitrator is final and is not subject to appeal. The DSB is "informed
promptly" of the decision, but does not adopt it. When requested to do so, the DSB grants
authorization (by negative consensus) to suspend concessions or other obligations, consis-
tent with the decision of the arbitrator. In practice, this means that where the arbitrator
has reduced the level of suspension requested, the complaining party puts in a new retali-
ation request, matching the level of nullification or impairment as determined by the ar-
bitrator. This revised request will be approved virtually automatically by the DSB.
D. QUANTIFYING THE NULLIFICATION OR IMPAIRMENT
Article 22.4 provides that the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations
authorized by the DSB shall be "equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment."
Arbitral panels have generally determined that the date from which nullification or im-
pairment should be measured is the date on which the defending party was to have been in
compliance, i.e., the end of the "reasonable period of time" for implementation. They have
not chosen the date of the adoption of measure that has subsequently been found to be
WTO-inconsistent." This is consistent with the well-established principle that the GATT/
VTO dispute settlement system generally does not provide damages for past losses. Instead,
as noted above, the preferred remedy is prospective, not retrospective: the defending party
is to withdraw the WTO-inconsistent measure. 47
Arbitrators have also determined the level of nullification or impairment through the use
of so-called "counterfactual" situations (i.e., a hypothetical state of affairs that would have
ciple" is that the complaining party should "first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect
to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation." However, if the
complainant "considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with
respect to the same sector(s)," then "it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in other sectors
under the same agreement." Going further, if the complainant considers that "it is not practicable or effective
to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement," and that
"the circumstances are serious enough," it may "seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another
covered agreement."
46. For example, the arbitrators in Hormones stated:
(We consider that our starting point is as follows: what would annual prospective ... exports of
hormone-treated beef and beef products to the EC be if the EC bad withdrawn the ban on 13 May 1999?
13 May 1999 is the date of expiration of the reasonable period of time granted to the EC to implement
the panel and Appellate Body reports... We cannot assume that the EC from 1989 onwards, i.e. from
the time it imposed the ban, was under a legal obligation to withdraw the ban. We note, in this respect,
that the violations found were violations of the SPS Agreement, an agreement only in existence from
1 January 1995 onwards [original emphasis].
Horwiones, supra note 12.
47. Since the special arbitration in Copyright Act was conducted during the implementation period, the
arbitrators found that it was not feasible to use the end of the implementation period as the point at which
nullification or impairment should be assessed. Instead, they chose the date on which the matter was referred
to them. See United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, Recourse to Arbitration under Article
25 of the DSU, Award of the Arbitrators, WT/DSI60/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001), at http://www.wto.org.
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existed if the defending party had complied with its obligations). The use of "counterfac-
tuals" to establish the level of nullification or impairment sustained by the complainant can
involve a fair degree of subjective assessment by the arbitrators.
For example, the arbitrators in Bananas considered a range of counterfactual situations
in order to determine the monetary value of the nullification or impairment sustained by
the United States. They compared the value of EC imports from the United States under
the then-existing, WTO-inconsistent regime with the value under various alternative,
WTO-consistent (counterfactual) regimes. Each counterfactual was based on a different
import regime, such as a tariff-only import system, a licensing system, or a tariff quota.
The arbitrators selected what they considered to be "a reasonable counterfactual" and made
their calculations on nullification or impairment based on this selection. There is virtually
no analysis in the report as to why the counterfactual they chose was a reasonable basis to
calculate the nullification or impairment suffered by the complainant.
The counterfactual approach has been followed in other cases.4 For example, in Hor-
mones, the arbitrators made a series of assumptions on what U.S. and Canadian exports of
hormone-treated beef to the EC would have been if the EC had withdrawn its ban. The
counterfactual included assumptions on issues such as trade volumes, price, and the division
of market share between Canada and the United States. A change in any one of these
assumptions could have led to very different conclusions regarding the level of nullification
or impairment sustained by the two complaining parties.
Robert Hudec has suggested that although the methodology followed by such arbitrators
may be flawed, their overall result may be politically acceptable. Writing about the report
of the arbitrators in Bananas, Hudec stated:
The report contained a lengthy description of the voluminous and complex information and
arguments submitted by the parties, but at the end the panel explained its conclusions in a
paragraph, announcing which of several alternative methods of measurement it had chosen
and then simply announcing the 'correct' number with little further explanation. As a scientific
explanation, the panel's report was disappointingly obscure. As a political solution to the issue,
however, it obviously looked objective enough to persuade the relevant audiences in both
countries that a neutral tribunal had made an objective assessment of equivalence. As long as
the relevant audiences were willing to accept the decision, it did all that was politically nec-
essary.49
Given the rather subjective nature of this process, it remains open to question whether
the "relevant audiences" will always be willing to accept such arbitral decisions. To the
extent that the arbitrators are rendering decisions that do not easily withstand analytical
scrutiny, affected parties may not be willing to concede the legitimacy of the results in all
future cases.
E. END NG RETAIATION
The DSU contains only skeletal provisions on how and when retaliation should be ter-
minated. Article 22.8 states in part:
48. The arbitrators in the 2000 EC/Ecuador arbitration chose the same counterfactual as was used in the
1999 US/EC arbitration. See Bananas: Decision by theArbitrators. (2000 Ecuador complaint), supra note 16, para.
166, at http://www.wto.org.
49. Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO
DIsPUTE SaI-rLEMEN PROCEDUES: ISSUES AND LESSONS FROM mE PAc'IcE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TaIUNALs 390-91 (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000).
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The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied
until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been
removed, or the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution
to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached.
Thus, as noted above, retaliation should apply only until one of three things happens:
(1) the WTO-inconsistent measure has been removed; (2) the defending party provides a
"solution" to the nullification or impairment, perhaps by providing temporary compensa-
tion; or (3) there is a mutually satisfactory settlement.
There are a number of problems with this provision. First, it provides no clear procedure
whereby the defendant can seek to have the retaliation lifted. Presumably, the defending
party would make a request to the DSB to withdraw the authorization to suspend conces-
sions, but Article 22.8 does not specifically say this.
Second, it provides no mechanism to resolve a dispute over whether the defending party
has, in fact, complied with the DSB rulings. What if the defending party asserts that it has
removed the WTO-inconsistent measure, but such an assertion is contested by the com-
plainant? What if the defending party in fact withdraws the WTO-inconsistent measure,
but immediately puts in place a new, equally restrictive replacement measure? There is
nothing in Article 22.8 on how such disputes could be resolved.50
Third, there is no express language imposing on the DSB the obligation to withdraw the
authorization if the conditions set out in Article 22.8 have been met. To date, the issue of
the withdrawal of the authorization to suspend concessions has not been brought before
the DSB. Nevertheless, the scope and application of Article 22.8 could well be the subject
of dispute in future.
F. PROBLEMS WITH RETALIATION
There are a number of well-known problems associated with the use of retaliation, most
notably the following. First, sanctions are usually imposed at a punitive rate, which has the
effect of stopping trade in the product that is the subject of the retaliation. Many have
argued that compliance issues should be resolved in a manner that promotes, rather than
harms, liberalized trade. As noted by the Report of the International Financial Institution
Advisory Commission: "Retaliation is contrary to the spirit of the WTO. Sanctions increase
restrictions on trade and create or expand groups interested in maintaining the restrictions.
Domestic bargaining over who will benefit from protection weakens support for open trad-
ing arrangements.""
Second, the use of retaliation may provide little or no relief to the affected industry in
the complaining party. Such an industry has been denied market access because of WTO-
illegal measures maintained by another country. To hit back against imports from the de-
fendant does not, from the standpoint of the affected industry, address this central problem.
50. In practice, given the lack of precision in Article 22.8, the disputing parties would likely reach an ad boc
agreement to resolve such disagreements through the compliance panel process under Article 21.5.
51. The Commission was established by the U.S. Congress to make recommendations on future U.S. policy
toward a number of international institutions, including the WTO. The Commission's report is available on-
line at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.htm. See alro Steve Chamovitz, Should the Teeth Be Pulled? A
Preliminary Assessment of WTO Sanctions (Sept. 15, 2000) (on file with the University of Minnesota Law
School).
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Moreover, abstract theories about the "rebalancing" of the bilateral commercial relationship
will likely be of scant interest to the industry whose goods or services still face WTO-
inconsistent market access barriers abroad.
Third, retaliation invariably imposes economic costs on the consumers and businesses of
the complaining party. For example, where tariffs are raised on the consumer goods of the
defendant, the consumers of the complaining party will face higher prices. Where the
imported products are used as intermediate goods in the production process, certain busi-
nesses in the complaining party will similarly face commercial hardship. Given the inte-
grated nature of many economies, particularly among developed countries, it is often very
difficult to design a retaliation list that does not inflict harm on the complainant."2
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, there is little hard evidence that retaliation can
and does achieve its objective of inducing compliance by the defendant. In Bananas, U.S.
sanctions were in place for over two years before a settlement was reached. The April 2001
U.S.-EU settlement was based on a number of factors, including the desire of both parties
to remove this significant irritant from the agenda in the run-up to the November 2001
WTO Ministerial Meeting in Qatar. The U.S. sanctions may have played a part in pro-
moting a resolution of the dispute, but few observers would argue that retaliation was the
principal cause of the settlement. Moreover, as noted above, the EC has still not complied
with the DSB rulings in Hormones, and the U.S. and Canadian sanctions imposed in May
1999 remain in place.
Given these problems with retaliation, what are some possible alternatives?
IV. Additional and Alternative Means of Seeking
Compliance
A. POLITICAL PRESSURE
Political pressure is invariably the sub-text that accompanies all trade disputes, and it is
rarely mentioned as supplementary means of seeking compliance. Nevertheless, it is worth
recalling briefly that a non-compliant defending party will usually face at least three separate
forms of political pressure.
First, it will face pressure from its own exporters, whose products are facing prohibitive
sanctions in the market of the complaining party. Members of the affected industry in the
defending party will press their own government to resolve the dispute in order to bring
about the removal of the sanctions. This pressure will usually commence before the actual
sanctions are put in place, particularly if the complaining party publishes an initial retali-
ation list, from which it will prepare a narrower final list of products subject to sanctions.
Indeed, engendering an adverse reaction from a range of industries in the defending party
is one of the reasons that a complainant will release such an initial retaliation list.
Second, the defending party may face growing bilateral political pressure in its relations
with the complainant. The failure of a defending party to comply with its obligations can
cloud bilateral relations, and what started out as a commercial dispute can develop into a
52. Petros Mavroidis writes: "WTO countermeasures, the ultima ratio of the system, fail on both effective-
ness and impartiality grounds... In all cases, economic theory suggests that the country adopting them 'shoots
itself in the foot' by imposing costs on its society." Petros Mavroidis, Remedies in the W'O Legal System: Between
a Rock and a Hard Place, 11(4) EuaoPMN J. INT'L LAw 763 (2000).
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major irritant in the broader political relationship. This will often generate additional pres-
sure on the defendant to resolve the dispute.
Third, the defendant will face multilateral political pressure within the WTO. The DSU
provides that issues of implementation are subject to the multilateral surveillance by the
DSB. This may require the defendant to explain to all WTO Members at DSB meetings
why it has not complied.
B. COMPENSATION AND FINES
As noted above, voluntary compensation is currently provided for in the DSU as a tem-
porary measure pending full implementation. Such compensation could take the form of
increased access to the market of the defending party. For example, the defending party
could agree to lower its bound rate on specified products as a form of interim compensation
pending the withdrawal of the illegal measure. It would do so on a most-favoured-nation
basis."
This has the advantage of expanding trade, rather than restricting trade through sanc-
tions. Nevertheless, this has been used rarely, in part because the complaining and defending
parties may have widely divergent views on the appropriate level of compensation. Since
the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, formal compensation has been agreed in only
two disputes.5 4
Another form of compensation-not provided for in the current rules-would be the
imposition of fines on the non-implementing defending party. Indeed, the International
Financial Institution Advisory Commission recommended the use of fines:
If countries do not accept WTO decisions, injured parties have the right to retaliate by putting
restrictions on imports from the offending country or region. The injured country then suffers
twice-once from the restrictions on its exports, imposed by foreign governments, and again
when tariffs or duties raise the domestic cost of the foreign goods selected for retaliation. To
compensate for the injury done by others, we impose costs on ourselves as well as them. The
Commission proposes that, instead of retaliation, countries guilty of illegal trade practices
should pay an annual fine equal to the value of the damages assessed by the panel or provide
equivalent trade liberalization."
While the concept of fines for non-compliance is not unknown in the international treaty
system, 6 it does give rise to a number of issues. If a defending party insists that it has
complied with its WTO obligations, it may be completely unwilling to pay a fine, which
in turn would raise the issue of the enforceability of such a remedy. In addition, to whom
53. Since all WTO Members would have a right to benefit from such lower rates, the complaining party
would presumably seek compensation in sectors or tariff lines in which it is the principal supplier.
54. The first was in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages: Mutually Acceptable Solution on Modalities for
Implementation, WT/DS8/l7 (uly 30, 1997), at http://www.wto.org. The second was in the U.S. Copyrigbt
Ac dispute. As noted above, in the latter case temporary compensation has been negotiated, although (as of
January 2002) not yet provided.
55. Meltzer Commission Report, Mar. 3, 2002, available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.pdf, at
107.
56. For example, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation and the North American
Agreement on Labour Cooperation provide for fines ("monetary enforcement assessments"). Similar mecha-
nisms are found in the Canada-Chile Agreement on Environmental Cooperation and the Canada-ChileAgree-
ment on Labour Cooperation. To date, none of these provisions have been applied.
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would such a fine be paid? To all WTO Members? To the complaining party alone? Would
the government of the complaining party be entitled to distribute the proceeds of such a
fine to the affected industry?
In any event, in many disputes the provision of compensation or the payment of fines
may do little to resolve the core basis of the dispute, which is the continued maintenance
of a WTO-inconsistent measure.
C. ROTATING THE SANCTIONS LIST: "CAROUSEL" RETALIATION
In May 2000, the U.S. Trade and Development Act 200011 was signed into law. This
legislation included a provision (section 407) that requires the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) to modify regularly the list of goods to which retaliation would apply. The press
has dubbed this law the "Carousel Retaliation Act," since it requires the list of products
subject to sanctions to be rotated-like a carousel.
In revising the retaliation list, the law requires the USTR to "act in a manner that is
most likely to result in the country... implementing the [DSB] recommendations." ' A
number of Members, particularly the EC, strongly oppose the notion of "carousel," prin-
cipally on the basis that it could lead to the imposition of sanctions above the level au-
thorized by the WTO. They note that when punitive tariffs are applied, it may not lead to
additional customs duties for the importing country-instead, it can stop trade in that
product. Therefore, they argue that a rotation of sanctions may have a cumulative effect in
excess of the level of suspension authorized by the DSB.
In June 2000, the EC requested WTO consultations on carousel, the first step in the
dispute settlement process.59 However, this dispute has not yet moved to the panel stage,
in part because, to date, the United States has not applied the legislation. No rotation of
sanctions has taken place. 60
D. COLLECTIVE RETALIATION
The notion of "collective retaliation" was first raised in the GATT in the mid-1960s,
when a number of developing countries argued that they lacked the ability to inflict com-
mercially meaningful retaliation on the economies of large developed countries. Theyurged
the adoption of a new system that would require all countries, not just the complainant, to
retaliate against the non-implementing party.61
The idea of collective retaliation raises a number of problems, including establishing a
system to ensure that the sanctions applied by the entire WTO community do not exceed
the specific amount authorized by the DSB (the "double-counting" problem). Moreover,
57. Trade and Development Act 2000, Pub. L. 106-200,114 Stat. 251.
58. Id.
59. United States - Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Amendments Thereto: Request for Consul-
tations by the European Communities, WT/DS200/1 and G/L/386 (June 13, 2000), at http://www.wto.org.
60. Robert Zoellick, United States Trade Representative, had earlier threatened to rotate sanctions if the
EU proceeded with its plan to implement a "first come, first served" transitional mechanism for the importation
of bananas. However, given the April 2001 U.S.-EU settlement of the Bananas dispute, and the concomitant
EU decision not to implement a "first come, first served" system, any rotation of sanctions has now presumably
been placed on the back burner.
61. Hudec, supra note 49, at 392-93.
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there could be possible trade diversion effects, in that imports may flow to a country that-
despite its obligations-has declined to impose the retaliation.
More to the point, however, is that an amendment would be required to the DSU in
order to implement the principle of collective retaliation, and many countries would not
agree to this. As argued above, it is extremely difficult for a complaining party to impose
sanctions in a way that does not hurt its own consumers and businesses. Many governments
would be even more reluctant to impose commercial harm on their economies in order to
resolve a completely unrelated trade dispute.
E. PUNITivE RETALIATION
Some have argued that in order to give sanctions more commercial force, the WTO
should have the ability to impose sanctions at a punitive level, instead of having them simply
match the level of nullification or impairment sustained by the complaining party. Punitive
retaliation is not permitted under current WTO rules.62
However, punitive retaliation would significantly compound the problem of the com-
mercial harm that sanctions impose on the economy of the complaining party, with no
assurance that it would actually induce compliance. Moreover, punitive sanctions may en-
gender sufficient resentment in the defending party so as to stiffen its resolve not to bow
to this form of pressure. 63
V. Conclusions
At this relatively early stage in the development of the WTO dispute settlement system-
slightly over seven years since the entry into force of the Agreement-a number of conclu-
sions may be drawn about the compliance and retaliation in the WTO. First, in general
terms, the record of compliance with WTO rulings has been very good. Most defending
countries, in most cases, have fully implemented the panel and Appellate Body reports.
Many countries clearly view it in their interest to promote the integrity of a rules-based
system, even if this means occasionally having to accept and implement an unpalatable
decision.
Second, the record of compliance tends to be better where the dispute is exclusively or
primarily a commercial one. Implementation problems are more likely to arise in cases that
also involve non-trade concerns. For example, the EC commitment to assist the economic
development of former European colonies in the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP)
region significantly complicated efforts to seek full EC compliance with the WTO rulings
in the Bananas dispute. Thus, the so-called "trade and" disputes have resulted in a higher
number of compliance problems.
Third, there has been relatively little use of compensation as an alternative to retaliation.
In principle, it is widely accepted that compensation is clearly preferable to retaliation.
However, compensation negotiations have often been unsuccessful. In many cases, the dis-
62. The arbitrators in the 1999 Bananas case noted that there was "nothing in Article 22.1 of the DSU, let
alone in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 22, that could be read as justification for counter-measures ofa punitive
nature." (Emphasis in original) Bananas: Decision by the Arbitrators (1999 U.S. complaint), supra note 12, para
6.3.
63. See Hudec, supra note 49, at 392.
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pute will remain unresolved until the illegal measure has been withdrawn. The provision
of compensation, particularly in unrelated sectors, may do little to address this.
Moreover, even where there is a will to negotiate compensation, the complaining and
defending parties may have markedly different ideas as to what would constitute an appro-
priate level of compensation. The compensation negotiations typically begin after a retal-
iation request has been made, when there is usually no agreement as to the level of "nul-
lification or impairment" sustained by the complainant. However, in the Copyright Act case,
as noted above, the United States and the EC held a special arbitration during the imple-
mentation period on the level of nullification or impairment. This facilitated the subsequent
negotiation of a temporary compensation agreement between the parties. This is an inter-
esting and constructive precedent, which will likely be followed in the future.
Fourth, the nature of retaliation has undergone a certain evolution since its first invo-
cation by the United States in Bananas in 1999. In most cases, complainants have sought
what might be regarded as "traditional" retaliation, in the form of punitive tariffs on certain
imported goods of the defendant. However, there have been cases in which "non tradi-
tional" retaliation has been sought, such as the requests made by the EC and Japan to adopt
laws to "mirror" the WTO-inconsistent U.S. Anti-Dumping Act of 1916. Similarly, the
proposed EC retaliation in the Copyright Act dispute-invoked in the event that the U.S.
Congress fails to fund the compensation package-would target U.S. copyright holders by
imposing an additional fee for enforcement of intellectual property rights in the EU. In
both these cases, it would seem that the complaining parties have sought to hasten the
withdrawal of the WTO-inconsistent measure by targeting the industries or sectors that
they regard as the principal beneficiaries of it.
Fifth, it is fair to say that retaliation has been less successful in inducing compliance than
anticipated by the drafters of the DSU. At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, many
officials were optimistic that the mere threat of automatic retaliation would serve as a
powerful tool to force recalcitrant defending parties to comply with their obligations. How-
ever, there have been disputes in which retaliation has either been threatened or actually
implemented, and yet the defending party has done nothing to comply. To date, such cases
have been relatively few in number. However, the effective enforcement of DSB rulings is
essential to ensure the continuing integrity of the WTO dispute settlement system.
The Uruguay Round brought about a number of significant improvements to the system
of trade dispute settlement. Nevertheless, it is evident that the much-heralded principle of
"automaticity" has its limitations. The automatic adoption of panel and Appellate Body
reports, and the automatic approval of retaliation requests, are no guarantee of automatic
compliance.
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